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Some years ago, I published a slender book on the topic of 
treaty conflict. Zooming in on the treaty relations of member 
states of the EU, I found that international law had little to 
say about treaty conflicts involving different parties. If party 
A has incompatible treaty obligations with states B and C, 
then it just has to make a choice or, as a German scholar
(and later EU judge) put it in the 1970s, what then applies is 
Das Prinzip der politischen Entscheidung – the principle of 
political decision. While many have recorded their 
frustration with the incapacity of international law to decide 
such issues, to me it also had a positive consequence: it 
allows a space for the conduct of politics.

That was pretty much where I left things, but fortunately 
Surabhi Ranganathan picked up on the idea and developed it 
further. For, if treaty conflicts allow space for politics, then it 
follows – so she hypothesized – that this space itself can be 
instrumentalized. In other words, so Ranganathan realized, it 
may well be the case that states deliberately create conflicts, 
so as to mould existing regimes into something more 
responsive to their current interests or needs. And she set 
out to investigate this further. The result was, first, an 
impressive PhD thesis (disclosure: I was one of her 
examiners), and second, an even more impressive revised 
version of that thesis in book form, under the title 
Strategically Created Treaty Conflicts and the Politics of 
International Law, published last year (2015) by Cambridge 
University Press.
When the ILC was busy drafting the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties and its provisions on treaty conflict, 
much energy was spent on downplaying the intentional 
creation of treaty conflicts. For, if conflicts were created 
intentionally, then the law would have a problem: surely, any 
intentionally created conflict would have to be regarded as a 
possible breach of the earlier treaty, and therewith give rise 
to inapplicability – perhaps even invalidity – of the later 
treaty. Such a prism might create an easily applicable rule 
(‘the older treaty always prevails’), but at considerable 
expense. First, such a rule would only cover part of the 
matter it ought to cover: the drafters were well aware that 
often enough, conflicts also come about unintentionally, 
even as they tried to downplay this. Second, and arguably of 
greater relevance, such a rule would make international law 
into a truly conservative force: any normative change would 
become very difficult, and practically subjected to the veto 
of even the smallest state. Even Hersch Lauterpacht, among 
ILC special rapporteurs the one with the greatest sympathy 
for prioritizing the lex prior (so much so that he thought that 
incompatible later treaties should be considered invalid), 
already realized the need to create a large exception (or 
loophole, in colloquial terms) for treaties concluded in the 
common interest: here, the later in time should prevail. 
Needless to say, making the distinction involves policing the 
borderline between the two, which would have created its 
own problems. Perhaps as a result, Lauterpacht’s successors 
as special rapporteurs, Gerald Fitzmaurice and in particular 
Humphrey Waldock, changed course.
On other points too, the ILC felt that the matter had to be 
defused, or sanitized. In addition to presuming that treaty 
conflict would be rare, and rarely intentional, it was 
considered that treaty conflicts would merely affect parts of 
a treaty. Hence, leaving entire treaties unapplied would be 
overkill (let alone invalidating them), so much so that the 
title of the most relevant article in the Vienna Convention 
(article 30), speaks no longer of conflicting treaties, but 
merely of conflicting obligations.
The ILC probably had to do its best to downplay the 
strategic creation of treaty conflicts: otherwise, no rule 
would ever have seen the light of the day. Ranganathan, 
however, is under no pressure to create a regime: her task is 
to make sense of one, and in this she succeeds wonderfully 
well. She takes three examples where states wittingly 
pushed conflicts through so as to adapt the overarching law. 
The first of these is the re-working of part of the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea so as to change the deep 
seabed mining regime. As is well-known, the original 
agreement was considered too socialist by the Reagan 
administration and a bunch of other states, which then 
started a movement to amend the Convention before it had 
even entered into force. With a great eye for detail and the 
illustrative anecdote, Ranganathan tells the story of this 
process. She then does something similar with the immunity 
agreements concluded between the US and a variety of 
states parties to the International Criminal Court Statute 
(the so-called ‘article 98 agreements’) and with the India-US 
nuclear deal against the background of the nuclear-
governance regime.
This calls for a number of comments. First, there is 
considerable variety between her chosen examples. The 
UNCLOS deal involved a number of states, some of which 
had signed the convention, while others had not. Either way, 
it concerned primarily prospective parties to a multilateral 
regime acting inter se. The article 98 agreements, by 
contrast, were concluded by parties to the ICC Statute, in 
each case with a single third party: the US. The nuclear deal 
also involved a third party setting, but this time (arguably) in 
reverse: a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (the US) 
used the deal to nudge a non-party (India) somewhat closer 
to the core of the regime.
Second, while all three episodes can be regarded as treaty 
conflict, they can also be framed differently, and it is one of 
the problems with the Vienna Convention’s regime (probably 
inevitably so, given the Convention’s focus on treaties as 
instruments rather than obligations) that it leaves this 
possibility wide open. The UNCLOS episode could be seen as 
a modification between some of the parties, something 
perfectly allowed by the Vienna Convention (provided some 
conditions are met); the surprising thing then is, above all, 
that the modification took place prior to the Convention’s 
entry into force. Indeed, the late Jonathan Charney once 
analyzed it from the point of view of the obligation not to 
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty pending ratification 
or entry into force, and that is a radically different frame. 
Likewise, while the article 98 agreements can be seen, as 
Ranganathan sees them, as embodying treaty conflicts, one 
can also view them, far more innocently, as subsequent 
practice by the parties in their relations with the outside 
world. This would probably be too rosy a picture, but still: it 
would not be completely eccentric. And by the same token, 
the US-India nuclear deal could well constitute subsequent 
practice too. The point is not (emphatically not) that 
Ranganathan is mistaken in viewing these manifestations as 
treaty conflict; the point is, instead, that different frames are 
possible, and sometimes plausible, as well, and that the 
choice for a particular frame, both by the actor and by the 
academic observer, is itself a political act.
Third, the involvement of the US in all three examples 
suggests that raw power – and the willingness to use it – 
may enter the picture. From the liberal cosmopolitan 
perspective, the three US positions in Ranganathan’s 
example represent the good (nudging India into the nuclear 
regime), the bad (undermining the ICC through immunity 
agreements) and the ugly (substituting profit for solidarity in 
deep seabed mining). The point that subtly comes across 
then is precisely that power can be used for different 
purposes, good and bad (or even ugly). The hero of one 
setting is another setting’s villain. As a result, Ranganathan 
suggests that there is little point in looking at power and 
politics monolithically – and that is a powerful, if largely 
subliminal, message to send.
Fourth, she suggests persuasively that law was not only the 
chosen battleground for these intensely political disputes, 
but also that the arms used on the ground were thoroughly 
law-oriented. All parties made all sorts of legality claims in 
favour of their respective positions, and produced all sorts of 
documents to back up their claims: Ranganathan wittily 
refers to this as document-rattling. In short, not only is the 
law intensely political, the political is likewise intensely legal, 
and short of using guns, canons and rockets, states typically 
use their legal arsenal to substantiate their political claims.
These four comments inevitably lead to a fifth, however 
subliminal perhaps again. Ranganathan’s study is, essentially, 
a sophisticated doctrinal study, but of the sort that would 
not have been conceivable even as recently as three decades 
ago. It is informed – coloured – by the insight that 
international law is highly political and politicized and, more 
fine-grained, that seemingly dry and technical issues such as 
treaty conflicts can become the theatre of grand political 
battles – which in turn are fought by legal means. Whereas 
earlier doctrinal studies – and still quite a few these days as 
well – would have taken treaty conflicts at face value (‘there 
are conflicting obligations; we have to find a solution, and by 
all means let us not lapse into politics”), she compellingly 
makes clear that these conflicts were never in search of a 
solution: instead, the conflicts were the solutions for the 
parties that instigated them. Heuristically, this insight would 
not have been possible without the platform offered by the 
emergence in the late 1980s of both critical legal studies (the 
works of Kennedy and Koskenniemi, in particular) and of 
constructivism in the study of international relations 
(Kratochwil, Onuf and others). Hence, perhaps the main 
contribution Ranganathan makes is to demonstrate by 
example that theoretically informed doctrinal work can truly 
be highly valuable. It is sometimes thought, or so it seems, 
that since the late 1980s the only good academic work in 
international law is either piggybacking on international 
relations approaches or social theory in disguise, about the 
role of law in the greater scheme of things. Blissfully, 
Ranganathan carves out a different space for doctrinal work, 
without ignoring theoretical concerns, and while 
acknowledging that international law and politics cannot be 
understood in strict separation. In short, she makes clear 
that law and politics need not be antagonistic in legal studies 
but can be combined to great effect without lapsing into 
sterility and a-historicity, like so much work does these 
days, whether doctrinal, critical, or rationalist in inspiration. 
And that in itself is a remarkable achievement.
Jan Klabbers is Academy Professor (Martti Ahtisaari Chair) at 
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